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Abstract 
Does emigration really drain human capital accumulation in origin countries? This paper 
explores a unique household survey purposely designed and conducted to answer this 
specific question for the case of Cape Verde. This is allegedly the African country suffering 
from the largest “brain drain”, despite also having a fast-growing stock of human capital. Our 
micro data enables us to propose a novel, explicit test of “brain gain” arguments according 
to which the possibility of own future emigration positively impacts educational attainment 
in the origin country. The innovative empirical strategy we propose hinges on the ideal 
characteristics of our survey, namely on full histories of migrants and on a new set of 
exclusion restrictions. Our results point to a very substantial impact of the “brain gain” 
channel on the educational attainment of those who do not emigrate. Alternative channels 
(namely remittances, family disruption, and general equilibrium effects at the local level) 
are also considered, but do not seem to play an important role. Our findings are robust 
to the choice of instruments and the empirical model. 
 
JEL Codes: F22, J24, O15. 
Keywords: Brain drain, brain gain, international migration, human capital, effects of 
emigration in origin countries, household survey, Cape Verde, sub-Saharan Africa. 
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1 Introduction 
The last decades witnessed striking growth in international migration flows.1 In particular, the 
international movement of the highly educated experienced an impressive surge: according to 
Beine et al. (2008), from 1990 to 2000, there was a 63.7% increase in the number of highly-
skilled immigrants residing in OECD countries (to a stock of 20 million), whereas the number 
of unskilled immigrants had only increased by 14.4% in the same ten years. This extraordinary 
trend has brought renewed interest and significance to the old ‘brain drain’ debate.  
Concerns about ‘brain drain’ were introduced in the late 1960s and 1970s, and soon 
became well rooted in the economics literature.2 ‘Brain drain’ became a general label for the 
depressing effects arising from the loss of the most skilled national citizens in a country. In the 
1990s, however, a new strand of theoretical literature proposed the ‘brain gain’ hypothesis: 
according to this proposition, it is possible that the outflow of educated migrants (and the 
possibility of own future migration in particular) can lead to a net increase in the origin country’s 
stock of human capital.3 
Despite the existing abundant theoretical literature on the ‘brain drain’ theme, the 
empirical literature has lagged until recently. This is due, at least partly, to data unavailability on 
the skill content of migration flows. Indeed, the dataset assembled by Docquier and Marfouk 
(2006) opened an avenue of renewed interest in the theme, prompting new research to verify 
and qualify the brain gain hypothesis across countries and over time (notably, Faini, 2006; 
Ozden and Schiff, 2006; and Beine et al. 2007 and 2008). In our opinion, what remains to be 
done in this literature is, importantly, testing this hypothesis at the micro level – i.e. to examine 
explicitly whether the probability of own, future migration improves individual educational 
attainment. This is precisely the purpose of our paper. 
In order to answer our research question, we make use of a new dataset: a tailored 
household survey conducted by the authors in Cape Verde in 2006. Cape Verde is a very 
interesting country for our purposes as it displays the highest ‘brain drain’ rate in the African 
continent,4 and yet also presents a fast growing stock of human capital, at least since 1990.5 
These are apparently contradictory facts under the light of traditional ‘brain drain’ theories, which 
point to the possibility of a ‘brain gain’ in this instance. 
In our empirical analysis, we are able to estimate the effect of the own future migration 
probability on education decisions because our data include the full histories of all household 
members, including those of current migrants, for whom we know characteristics at the time 
educational choices were made. In doing so, we assume that individuals who reside in Cape 
                                                                          
1. Chiswick and Hatton (2003) offer a detailed description of this historical evolution and underlying mechanisms. 
2. Scott and Gruber (1966) and Bhagwati and Hamada (1974) were the main proponents for the ‘brain drain’ theories. 
The ‘brain drain’ effects presumably include the disappearance of a critical mass in production, research, public services 
(notably health and education) and political institutions, which could potentially be magnified by positive human capital 
externalities, or complementarities with factors of production or total factor productivity. In addition, massive emigration 
of the most educated could entail fiscal losses due to foregone revenues from public education of those who emigrate. 
3. This theory was put forward by Mountford (1997), Stark et al. (1997, 1998) and Vidal (1998). It proposed that a ‘brain 
gain’ could happen if expected returns to education increased when emigrating (as would be the case if host countries 
have higher returns to education than origin countries) and enough skilled individuals eventually decided not to emigrate. 
4. Our source is Docquier and Marfouk (2006), who report the ‘brain drain’ rate to be 67.5%. ‘Brain drain’ is defined as 
the fraction of highly educated Cape Verdean nationals who reside abroad. 
5. Batista et al. (2007) show that, over the period 1990-2005, the stock of human capital in Cape Verde grew at an 
annual rate of 3.5%. In addition, according to their growth accounting results, human capital accumulation is the 
aggregate input that accounts for most of the excellent growth performance of the Cape Verdean economy over those 
15 years. 
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Verde decide around age 12 whether to complete a non-compulsory intermediate level of 
secondary schooling. At that point in time, they have certain information about their prospects of 
future emigration – which may or not happen in the future. In our regressions, our individual unit 
of observation are dependents aged between 16 and 30 years of age, who never emigrated 
before age 16 – thereby ensuring that their decision to complete schooling or not is made 
before migration. For this subset, we examine the educational impact of the own probability of 
future migration, which corresponds to testing the original ‘brain gain’ hypothesis. Our baseline 
results point to a 10 pp increase in the probability of own future migration improving the average 
probability of completing intermediate secondary school by around 8 pp. These results are 
robust to the choice of instruments and econometric model. 
In order to give precise meaning to our econometric estimates, we use a simultaneous 
equation model of migration and education decisions to simulate the behavior of an economy hit 
by changes in migration barriers – e.g. intensified immigration restrictions in destination 
countries. In particular, we are able to measure the effects of this counterfactual exercise on 
migration decisions and on the educational attainment of both non-migrants and of migrants – 
for which purpose we complement our survey data with those from censuses of the main 
international destinations of Cape Verdean emigrants. Our results show that a rise in migration 
barriers has non-linear effects (the elasticity of educational responses to changes in migration 
seems to increase with the size of the shock) with differential impact on migrants and non-
migrants. For instance, a shock decreasing migration by 9 pp, reduces the educational 
attainment of non-migrants by 11 pp (implying an elasticity of 0.34), and that of migrants by only 
7 pp (implying an elasticity of 0.17). This evidence supports the importance of the ‘brain gain’ 
mechanism, even after we account for the educational upgrade by early migrants who may 
return when migration policies are made more restrictive. 
Our work is related to two main strands in the migration literature. The first is the 
previously mentioned, cross-country empirical work on the ‘brain gain’ hypothesis as defined at 
a macro level.6 This approach has the advantage of distinguishing between countries that are 
more or less affected by ‘brain gain’ – only in poorer countries with sufficiently low emigration 
rates does human capital accumulation seem to benefit from skilled emigration. However, the 
simplistic definition of ‘brain gain’ at the macro level (as a country’s native tertiary schooling 
growth due to migration of skilled workers) misses potentially important individual heterogeneity 
and is, by design, incapable of identifying the channels through which these positive effects 
work. Our study overcomes these limitations by using micro data from our tailored household 
survey, which enables us to explicitly test and find supportive evidence to the own probability of 
future migration channel  – i.e. the original ‘brain gain’ hypothesis.  
This paper is also related to microeconometric work on the effects of having a migrant 
in the household on the educational attainment of Mexican children, as in Hanson and Woodruff 
(2002) and McKenzie and Rapoport (2006). Unlike these studies, we model the simultaneous 
decisions of educational attainment and own migration, which allows us to test explicitly for the 
original ‘brain gain’ hypothesis. In Hanson and Woodruff (2002) and McKenzie and Rapoport 
(2006) it is not that clear which mechanism is underlying the positive correlation between 
parental emigration and children’s education. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we begin by 
presenting a brief overview of Cape Verde. We then proceed, in section 3, by presenting our 
data sources, namely the household survey we use in our empirical work, including descriptive 
statistics, and our estimates for ‘brain drain’ in Cape Verde. In section 4, we present the 
econometric model and identification strategy. We start by estimating a linear probability model 
                                                                          
6. Notably, Faini (2006) and Beine et al. (2007, 2008). 
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– a simple and convenient way to check the appropriateness of using exclusion restrictions in 
our estimation. After checking for the validity of the instruments, we propose a non-linear 
simultaneous model for the latent variables underlying the migration and education individual 
choices. In section 5, the main ‘brain gain’ positive empirical findings are presented and 
discussed, along with robustness checks. In the following section, counterfactual scenarios are 
computed under which barriers to migration are increased, and the effects on migration and 
education are discussed. Section 6 empirically examines briefly the possible reasons why a 
higher likelihood to emigrate may promote increased educational attainment. Finally, section 7 
summarizes our findings and presents policy implications. 
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2 Cape Verde: a short introduction to the country  
Cape Verde is a nine-island country with 441,000 inhabitants, according to the latest 2000 
census. It became independent from Portugal in 1975 and has been a stable democracy 
since 1991. The country is currently ranked by the World Bank as a ‘Lower Middle-Income’ 
economy, and had a GDP per capita of 5900 PPP-Adjusted Dollars in 2003, according to 
Heston et al. (2006). 
Cape Verdean economic growth clearly exceeded the Sub-Saharan African average 
of 0.6% GDP per capita growth over 1980-2004, according to Heston et al. (2006). Indeed, it 
was the third fastest country in terms of per capita growth out of the 45 sub-Saharan 
countries in Heston et al. (2006), after Equatorial Guinea (11% average annual growth rate) 
and Botswana (5%). These countries are both rich in natural resources and exports account 
for a large fraction of their GDP (47% and 55%, respectively). Unlike them, Cape Verde 
stands out growing at an average annual rate of 4.4% (4.1% over 1981-1990, 5.8% over 
1991-2000) but with exports accounting for only 20% of its GDP and no natural resource 
abundance – rather the opposite, as droughts and famines were recurrent in the country’s 
history.  
Droughts and famines indeed prompted the massive emigration phenomenon that 
has characterized this country for many decades. According to our calculations,7 there are 
more than 100.000 Cape Verdean currently residing abroad, or about 19% of all nationals. 
Docquier and Marfouk (2006) estimate the percentage of the highly educated labor force of 
Cape Verde living abroad at 67.5% – the largest such number in the African continent. In 
addition, the magnitude of international remittances received in Cape Verde is impressive: as 
shown in Fig. 1, these flows account for 16% of GDP on average over 1987-2003 (according 
to the World Bank, 2006b). Moreover, we should note that these are official numbers, likely 
underestimated as they do not include informal channels. These figures are again the largest 
in sub-Saharan Africa and translate the especially important role of remittances for the 
country, particularly given the relative magnitude when compared to aid and foreign direct 
investment inflows. 
A final note is deserved by the educational system in Cape Verde, which potentially 
provides the supply side restriction to our question of interest. The system functions 
remarkably well, particularly for sub-Saharan African standards, at least until the university 
level. Primary (six compulsory years of schooling) and secondary schooling (six further years 
grouped in three levels) are widely available at the local level (there is at least one secondary 
school per municipality, even more so at the primary level). Higher education institutions only 
started working in the country in 1995 and are located in the capital island.  
The following figure illustrates the age of the child when the household decides 
whether to keep her in school or not. 
 
                                                                          
7. To compute the number of Cape Verdeans living abroad we sum the number of Cape Verdeans in the censuses of 
the main destination countries for which we have available data (Portugal, United States, France, Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, Italy and Spain), and divide it by 0.92 (emigrants to these destination countries represent, according to our 
survey, 92% of all emigrants from Cape Verde in the last five years). 
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3 Data description 
Data sources 
Our empirical work is mainly based upon a household survey on migration and the quality of 
public services tailored to answer our research questions. The survey was conducted in Cape 
Verde from December 2005 to March 2006 by the CSAE at the University of Oxford. It was 
based on a representative sample of 1066 resident households (including both non-migrants 
and return migrants), and also provides information on a large sample of current emigrants. 
The questionnaire included two modules: one on perceived quality/corruption of public 
services; and the other on migration characteristics of the household. The household reporter 
(someone aged at least 30 years old) was asked to specify socio-demographic characteristics 
of all members of the household, including children who already live elsewhere. Moreover, he 
was asked to characterize all migration spells within the household, including who emigrated, 
where and when. Finally, there were some questions regarding the economic situation of the 
household such as living standards, income or whether any member of the family received 
remittances in the previous year. More information regarding the survey can be found in 
Appendix A. 
As detailed in the following sections, we complement our dataset with several 
secondary data sources. In particular, we make use of the Cape Verde Census (INE 2002); the 
Income and Expenditure Household Survey (INE 2004), designed and conducted by the Cape 
Verde National Statistics Office (INE) in 2001-2002 under the sponsorship of the World Bank; 
and several censuses from the main destination countries to Cape Verdean migrants, available 
from IPUMS, Ruggles et al. (2004).
General descriptive statistics 
In this section we briefly characterize the information from our household survey, emphasizing 
the comparability of our data with those of other sources. 
Our survey seems to accurately depict the migration reality in Cape Verde except for 
the fact that it misses a particular type of emigrants: those who did not leave family behind. In 
order to correct for the potential selection bias induced by this limitation, we use census data 
characterizing Cape Verdean immigrants in the main destination countries.8 This information 
allows us not only to estimate the stock of emigrants abroad, but also to examine observable 
characteristics of emigrants, such as gender, age and education. This information proves 
particularly important to precisely measure ‘brain drains and gains’, and adjust these for 
emigrants’ educational upgrades abroad. 
As can be observed from Table 1, the figures for migration flows for the period 2000-
2005 in our survey are relatively close to those presented in the INE (2002) census for the period 
1995-2000. Table 2 displays the main destinations for Cape Verdean emigrants. According to 
both our survey and the INE (2002) census, Portugal and the USA account for respectively 
about 55% and 20% of the total emigration flows.  
                                                                          
8. The main destination countries, accounting for practically all Cape Verdean migrants, for which we have available 
census data are: Portugal, United States, France, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy and Spain. We used the 5% sample of 
the American census from IPUMS (Ruggles et al., 2004). Information on Cape Verdean in Portugal was provided by the 
National Statistics Office of Portugal and information for other European countries was taken from Eurostat. 
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Table 3 compares information from IPUMS (Ruggles et al., 2004) on the number, 
gender and age of Cape Verdean that reside in France, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy and 
Spain, with the same information for those who reside in Portugal and the USA.9 It is evident 
that the stock of emigrants abroad coming out of the survey is smaller than our estimates based 
on the censuses of the main international destinations. This mismatch reflects the fact that 
several whole and reunited families reside abroad. These families cannot, by design, be included 
in our sample, contrary to what happens in the censuses of the foreign countries where they 
live. The results show that there are minor gender differences, but that the age profile of 
emigrants to all destinations is remarkably similar. As could be expected, and still according to 
Table 3, the age profile of emigrants in our survey and that coming from the censuses is similar, 
except for the fact that our survey tends to exaggerate the fraction of individuals aged 21-30 
years old, which are likely to be emigrants leaving their (interviewed) families behind. Conversely, 
children aged 10 years old or less, who likely emigrated with their whole families, are under-
represented in our survey. Also unsurprisingly, the results in Table 3 show that, relative to 
residents in Cape Verde, emigrants tend to be slightly disproportionately males and in their 
prime-working years. Return migrants are strongly disproportionately males and aged more than 
50 years old. 
Traditional measures of ‘brain drain’ 
We now turn to characterizing the educational attainment of Cape Verdean emigrants relative 
to residents in the country. This is directly related to conventional narrow measures of ‘brain 
drain’, defined as the proportion of highly-skilled Cape Verdean living abroad. 
Table 4 describes the educational attainment of Cape Verdean individuals aged at least 
25 years old who reside in Portugal and the United States (representing nearly 75% of all Cape 
Verdean emigrants). We observe that the educational attainment of emigrants differs in the 
censuses and in our survey. Namely, the survey displays a larger fraction of emigrants with 
higher education. This is probably due to the fact that the survey misses information about 
complete household emigration, thereby increasing the relative weight of those individuals who 
emigrated alone with the purpose of pursuing higher education. We will therefore use data from 
the censuses as our source in measuring ‘brain drain’. 
According to the census data characterizing emigrants to both Portugal and the United 
States, there seems to be evidence of positive selection of migrants. Indeed, emigrants are 
disproportionately concentrated in middle and high levels of education (i.e. completion of at least 
9 grades) relative to the non-migrant population. This disproportion is particularly high for 
emigrants who hold a university degree: 6.65% of emigrants, relative to only 3.40% of residents 
in Cape Verde. 
Analyzing the information available for each of the two main destination countries, we 
uncover finer patterns of emigrant selection than those provided by aggregate numbers. 
Actually, there seems to be clear positive selection only for emigrants to the United States. 
Except at the university level, the educational attainment of emigrants residing in Portugal is 
actually lower than that of residents in Cape Verde.10 Given these differences across countries, it 
is not obvious how to approximate the educational attainment of the residual 25% of emigrants 
for which no educational data are available (mainly residing in France). We opt for the 
                                                                          
9. According to our survey, 92% of all emigrants from Cape Verde migrate to these countries. We are, therefore, 
confident of capturing most of the emigrants. 
10. This finding is consistent with a lower cost of emigration to Portugal relative to the United States, perhaps because 
of the common language, shorter geographical distance or longer emigration tradition. 
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conservative assumption (in the sense that it yields maximum ‘brain drain’) that the residual 
emigrants have the same educational attainment as emigrants residing in the United States. The 
results of this assumption are presented in the fourth column of Table 4. 
With this distribution of emigrant educational attainment in hand, we can now compute 
a measure of ‘brain drain’. The measure traditionally used in the literature is the one proposed 
by Docquier and Marfouk (2006), i.e. the fraction of Cape Verdean university degree holders 
residing abroad. Using this definition and according to our data displayed in Table 4, the ‘brain 
drain’ in Cape Verde is 40%. This number is much lower than the 67.5% reported by Docquier 
and Marfouk (2006), who provide the only existing numbers for ‘brain drain’ in Cape Verde.11 
Most likely this difference is due to Docquier and Marfouk (2006)’s source of data on 
educational attainment in Cape Verde,12 in addition to discrepancies in the classification of 
educational degrees, particularly the ‘high-skilled’.13 Since the proportion of high-skill individuals 
is low among Cape Verdean, small differences in the classification of ‘high-skill’ are potentially 
capable of producing large differences in measuring ‘brain drain’. For this reason, we propose to 
consider alternative measures of ‘brain drain’, namely focusing on groups with relatively more 
weight in the population. For instance, the probability of emigration given at least an intermediate 
secondary level is 43%, and that for Docquier and Marfouk is 44%. 
A final qualification regarding the traditional brain drain measures has to do with 
potential educational upgrading after migration. The magnitude of this phenomenon will likely 
affect ‘brain drain’ numbers. Indeed, 20% of immigrants from Cape Verde in the United States 
arrived before age 10 and they subsequently present higher educational degrees. Migrating 
early in life affects the educational attainment in destination countries. However, it is very difficult 
to distinguish between the fraction of the difference that is attributed to unobserved 
heterogeneity and the fraction that is attributed to the fact that those individuals are entering in a 
different educational system. This possibility can be explored by switching the educational 
attainment of those migrants who emigrate early in life with the educational attainment of those 
with same characteristics departing later. Batista et al. (2007) show that important differences 
between migrants and non-migrants remain nevertheless. 
 
                                                                          
11. Carrington and Detragiache (1998) and Collier et al. (2004) provide numbers for several African countries, but not for 
Cape Verde. 
12. For most developing countries, Docquier and Marfouk (2006) use Barro and Lee (2001) as their source of information 
on educational attainment. This is missing for Cape Verde, and the criterion indicated for these cases is to use 
“neighboring countries”. 
13. In Docquier and Marfouk (2006) the highly-skilled group includes all those who attended university, even if they did 
not complete a degree. Comparability of classifications of educational degrees in Cape Verde, the US and Portugal is 
discussed in Appendix B.  
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4 Econometric model and identification strategy  
The hypothesis of ‘brain gain’ suggests that the mere possibility of one’s migration in the 
future may improve his or her educational attainment in the origin country even if this person 
ends up never migrating. In this section, we propose an econometric model and methodology 
to identify this ‘brain gain’ effect, i.e. to explicitly estimate the impact of the own future 
probability of migration on schooling decisions in Cape Verde. 
Econometric model 
In order to estimate this ‘brain gain’ effect, we propose the following latent variable model. 
There are three latent variables S*, M*(a) and M*, which govern, respectively, the decisions on: 
educational attainment, S; (future) migration decision at age a when the decision of 
completing education is made, M(a); and actual migration decision, M. While the first two 
latent variables, S* and M*(a), are known simultaneously, the third one, M*, may be thought of 
as an update to M*(a) at some point in the future: 
)0(1 *  ii SS  with  isiii XaMS   ')( 2
*
10
*
                       
(1) 
iamiii
YSaM )(2
*
10
* ')(                                                              (2) 
)0(1 *  ii MM  with  imii aMM  )(
**
                             
(3) 
Basically, the idea behind (1) - (3) is that at age a individual i makes two human capital 
investment decisions: she decides whether it is worthwhile to invest in further education or not 
and whether it is worthwhile to migrate or not. According to these rules, child i will acquire 
education (Si = 1) as long as the education latent variable Si* is non-negative. Similarly, migration 
in the future will occur (Mi = 1) as long as the respective latent variable is non-negative, i.e. Mi*
imi aM  )(
*
 0. 
The latent variable governing the education decision, Si*, depends on several factors (Xi) 
that potentially vary at the individual, household and regional levels. In addition, it is also 
influenced by the determinants of the own migration decision at the date schooling choices are 
made, )(* aMi . This latent variable in turn depends on several covariates (Yi) that potentially 
also include individual, household and regional characteristics, and depends in addition on the 
determinants of the educational decision, Si*. In the future, however, regardless of the individual 
migration plans at age a, there may be unexpected shocks (mi) that impact the realized actual 
migration decision, Mi, as described in (3). 
Mathematically, the three latent variables depend on vectors of variables Xi and Yi 
which include individual, family, and locality-level characteristics of child i and additive random 
error terms, si , m(a)i and mi, which may be correlated. For example, it is possible that individual i 
has an innate ability to learn, which could decrease both the costs of acquiring education and of 
migrating (e.g. if this ability facilitates the study of foreign languages and integration in foreign 
communities). 
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Model (1) - (3) presents a practical problem if one is interested in estimating its 
parameters: we do not observe the migration decision at age a, but only the actual migration 
decision realized at some point in the future, Mi. This problem occurs even if one is only really 
interested in estimating 1. In order to overcome this problem, we can rewrite the previous 
model as follows: 
                   iiii XMS 12
*
10
* ''    where we observe )0(1 *  ii SS                     (4) 
                  iiii YSM 22
*
10
* ''    where we observe )0(1 *  ii MM                (5) 
Identification strategy 
Under this framework, our ‘brain gain’ test will depend crucially on the value taken by 
parameter 1. Several estimation issues arise in its estimation. First, as previously discussed, 
there may be unobserved characteristics of the individual that simultaneously make her both 
more likely to emigrate in the future and more (or less) likely to get a higher educational 
attainment. Second, there is likely reverse causality, i.e. this individual may emigrate with a 
higher likelihood if she is more (or less) educated. We therefore need exclusion restrictions on 
X with respect to Y in order to identify our parameter of interest. In particular, we need 
variables that affect the migration decision and are know at the time the education decision is 
made, but which do not directly affect this education decision. For this purpose, we exploit 
the full history of migration in the household, which we have available from our survey, and 
propose that the duration of the longest migration spell in the family when the child is aged 12 
or less years old (which we will simply label in the rest of the paper as ‘family migration 
duration at age 12’) is used as an instrument in our baseline results.14 
The length of the family migration spell provides us with information regarding the 
success of the closest migration experience to the child. Indeed, longer migration spells in the 
household likely reflect more successful migration experiences that should translate into deeper 
access to migrant networks. This network access should help facilitate migration for other 
household members. In contrast, a short duration of family migration might be consequence of 
a failure in the migration experience, which could decrease importantly the perceived net 
benefits of future migration. Considering the maximum duration of a family migration spell further 
ensures that we are capturing this effect, as it allows us to exclude smaller ‘trial’ or ‘follow-up’ 
migration experiences. 
Notice that the underlying reasons for failure or success of family migration experiences 
should be exogenous to an individual child’s educational decision, except for the information 
provided regarding the potential benefits of education if the child migrates at some point in the 
future – and this is exactly the sort of ‘brain gain’ argument we aim at testing. Note, in addition, 
that unlike the exclusion restrictions proposed in the related literature,15 this instrument presents 
individual variability on its own (as opposed to household or regional variability only). 
Consequently, this measure appears to be a good candidate for instrumenting the probability of 
an individual child’s future migration at the time her educational investment is being decided. 
                                                                          
14. The choice of age 12 corresponds to the age at which the decision to pursue secondary schooling is made by Cape 
Verdean children. Moving this threshold to age 13 or 14 does not significantly change results. 
15. This is the case of the historical regional rates of migration previously used by Hanson and Woodruff (2002) and 
McKenzie and Rapoport (2006). 
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We nevertheless include several additional regressors in our specification to ensure that 
this instrument is not capturing any family migration effect that is correlated to educational 
choices. In particular, we first start by taking into account disruptive effects of migration to the 
family structure (such as the absence of parents in their roles of models and guardians, as well 
as the requirement of older children to take on household responsibilities, be it working at home 
or outside) by controlling for absent father and/or mother in the household. Second, success or 
failure of the family’s migration experience may be correlated with the level of education of the 
migrant, which in turn could affect the educational level of the child. For this reason, it is 
reassuring that parental education is also included in the main regression. We believe that once 
we control for these variables in the education equation, it is appropriate to assume that ‘family 
migration duration at age 12’ is only correlated with the individual schooling decision through the 
own probability of future migration. 
Formal econometric tests support our arguments in favor of the adequacy of the 
instruments used in this paper. Despite all control variables included in our baseline specification 
(displayed in Table 5, and further discussed in the following section), ‘family migration duration at 
age 12’ remains a relevant instrument. In the first stage regressions, it is individually significant at 
the 1% level, and an F-test on the excluded instrument rejects the hypothesis of it not having 
explanatory power, regardless of the critical values used: 10 from Staiger and Stock (1997)’s 
rule-of-thumb; 8.96 from Stock and Yogo (2005)’s more carefully derived results. Because our 
F-statistic is computed taking into account clustering at the household level, we deem our 
comparison with i.i.d. critical values as conservative. 16 
As a robustness check, we choose to exploit an additional, still parsimonious, 
econometric specification using both ‘family migration duration at age 12’ and ‘regional 
proportion of migrants’ as exclusion restrictions. The latter variable is given by the fraction of 
migrants in the locality where the child resides, and is closely related to the historical regional 
rates of migration previously used in the related microeconometric literature, namely by Hanson 
and Woodruff (2002) and McKenzie and Rapoport (2006). The underlying idea is that past 
migration proxies well for existing networks, which strongly affect current migration at the 
regional level, through their effects on the net benefits of migrating. 
In order for this to be a valid instrument, it is important that the reasons that first started 
historical migration are uncorrelated with the current motives to complete intermediate 
secondary education. In the case of Cape Verde, this fact seems all the more plausible since 
migrations in Cape Verde started centuries ago due to droughts and famines, fully exogenous to 
the decision of acquiring education nowadays. In any event, our specification includes several 
regional variables (such as island dummies, local unemployment rates, and local ratios of skilled 
relative to unskilled workers), which should capture any remaining general equilibrium effects on 
educational choices. 
The first stage regressions for our alternative specification (adding ‘local proportion of 
migrants’ as an instrument) are displayed in columns (3) and (4) of Table 5. Both instruments are 
                                                                          
16. Note that, to the best of our knowledge, there is not available in the econometric literature a precisely suitable critical 
value against which to compare our F-statistic to test for weak instruments (i.e. no critical values exist that account for 
clustered standard errors). For this reason, we take into account both the Staiger and Stock (1997) rule-of-thumb for a 
suitable instrument, and the Stock and Yogo (2005) 2SLS/LIML critical values for an instrument that meets the maximal 
10% size distortion for a 5% Wald test criterion, even though these critical values are computed assuming i.i.d. errors. 
An alternative possible criterion for the strength of an instrument could be not to exceed the maximal bias of 10% of the 
IV estimator relative to the OLS inconsistency. Critical values for this criterion are, however, only available when at least 
three instruments are used. Using these critical values, we can already reject the null of weak instrument, despite the fact 
that critical values for this criterion are decreasing in the number of instruments. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 20 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0902 
individually significant in this set of regressions. The outcome of F-tests on the excluded 
instruments, however, depends on the estimation method used: the hypothesis of weak 
instruments is clearly rejected when robust methods (such as LIML and CUE) are used, whereas 
this is not necessarily the case for 2SLS. Since changes in the estimated coefficients of interest 
are small when different estimation methods are used (namely 2SLS vs. LIML), we feel 
reassured that this is not a problem in our case.17 However, taking a conservative perspective, 
we will adopt as baseline specification the one with the single exclusion restriction provided by 
‘family migration duration at age 12’. 
Finally, the specification that includes more than one instrument provides us with a joint 
test for the exogeneity of both ‘family migration duration at age 12’ and ‘local proportion of 
migrants’. Exogeneity of both instruments cannot be rejected by a Sargan-Hansen test of 
overidentifying restrictions (robust to clustering at the household level). 
Estimation 
In order to estimate our model, and most crucially, our parameter of interest, 1, we focus first 
on a standard linear probability model. This has the advantage of simplicity and better-
established properties and tests (e.g. for the weak instrument potential problems discussed 
above). In addition, as shown by Angrist (1991), the use of 2SLS to estimate binary outcomes 
can be justified and indeed shown to consistently estimate average treatment effects. 
In a linear setting, 
*)|( iii SXSP   and 
*)|( iii MXMP  . Therefore, one can 
write iii uSS 1
*

 and iii uMM 2
*

. The regression model hence becomes: 
                                   iiii uXMS 1210 ''                                                     (6) 
                    iiii uYSM 2210 ''                                                      (7) 
In this context, 1 can be simply estimated by 2SLS on (6). 
The non-linear model (4)-(5) can also be estimated consistently following Mallar (1977), 
taking into account the characteristics of our model (namely the dependent variables’ continuity) 
that make it different from the model underling conventional ‘IV Probit’ estimates. The method 
proposed by Mallar (1977) consists of estimating a reduced form of the index
*
iM in equation 
(5), which we can then use as a regressor in the structural estimation of equation (4). Note that it 
is possible to follow this two-stage procedure given the continuity of the index function, 
*
iM . 
The model to be estimated therefore becomes: 
                   iiii XMS 12
*
10
* ''   where we observe )0(1 *  ii SS      (8) 
                  iiii uYXM  '' 210
*

where we observe )0(1 *  ii MM        (9) 
                                                                          
17. Note that we are still comparing F-statistics adjusted for clustering at the household level, whereas the critical values 
used for comparison are computed assuming i.i.d. errors, which should lead to too little rejections of the null of weak 
instruments. 
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The same strategy will apply to the structural estimation of equation (5). Notice that, as 
pointed out in Maddala (1983), we can only identify the actual parameter up to a constant. If (1i,
 2i) is distributed following a bivariate normal, 
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the coefficient for Mi* in (4), estimated by maximum likelihood, is a consistent estimator 
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Given its appropriateness to precisely capture the effect of a certain probability of future 
migration (a positive and small number limited to be between 0 and 1) on the probability of 
acquiring a certain level of education, this non-linear model is particularly relevant to interpret the 
discrete variable IV results, as well as to perform precise counterfactual exercises. 
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5 Econometric results 
In this section, we summarize the main empirical results in this paper. In particular, we 
present, interpret and discuss the robustness of our ‘brain gain’ estimates. 
Preliminary evidence 
Before estimating the ‘brain drain’ or ‘brain gain’ parameters of interest discussed in the 
previous section, we start by examining the results in Table 6, which display simple OLS and 
Probit estimates of the (intermediate secondary) schooling attainment of migrants relative to 
non-migrants (note that we restrict our sample to dependents aged 16-30 who never 
migrated before age 16).18 
Note that the measure of educational attainment we use is that of a certain school 
grade by children in a certain age interval. This specification therefore allows us to evaluate what 
the effect of migration is on attaining a given school level for children at a precisely-defined age. 
In our baseline model we consider attainment of an intermediate secondary school grade (9 
years) by dependents aged 16-30 years old.19 This grade is relevant because it is attained by 
around 40% of students and it is not compulsory, unlike primary schooling. Complete 
secondary schooling (12 years) would also be interesting to study, but is only attained by a 
smaller fraction of individuals. 
Without controlling for any other covariates, there seems to be a striking statistically 
significant difference between the educational attainment of migrants relative to non-migrants 
(+13 pp for OLS). Following the standard in the literature on determinants of educational 
attainment, we consider whether the observed educational differences are still relevant after 
controlling for the traditional covariates: (i) individual level characteristics empirically related to 
performance (gender, age); (ii) household level proxies for available resources (number of 
children, asset ownership), as well as for the quality of family environment (highest completed 
parental educational level) and for perceptions of the quality of schooling (which are likely related 
to the expected benefits to be derived from education); and, finally, (iii) local level variables such 
as island, urban area, and other average local variables (such as unemployment, average per 
capita household expenditure and the skill to unskilled labor force ratio) that may affect local 
returns to schooling. After controlling for all regressors, there is a difference of 12 pp between 
the educational attainment of migrants and non-migrants, which remains strongly significant. 
The signs of all significant coefficients are as expected and do not vary with the type of 
estimation. 
Estimating the ‘brain gain’ effect 
We now turn to estimating our parameter of interest, which can be interpreted as a measure 
of the ‘brain gain’ effect, i.e. the impact that the own future probability of migration has on 
                                                                          
18. Focusing on those who stayed in Cape Verde until at least age 16, we can safely assume that the schooling decision 
was made before emigration – recall that intermediate secondary schooling should be completed before or around age 
16 (allowing for repetition). This enables us to estimate the effect of the probability of future emigration on the decision to 
complete schooling for this subsample. Changing this threshold to age 18 did not significantly change our results. We 
choose to focus on dependents aged no older than 30 years old to ensure we have full information on these individuals, 
particularly at the household level (given the design of the survey, as detailed in Appendix A). This is also a particularly 
interesting interval to analyze as this corresponds to a prime working age, at which migration decisions peak. 
19. McKenzie and Rapoport (2006) also take completed school grades as their dependent variable, but require the use 
of censored-order probit models to account for problems caused by right-censoring. Because we consider a particular 
grade only, in addition to adopting appropriate age intervals, right-censoring for our variable of interest is unlikely. 
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individual educational attainment. Following the identification strategy proposed and defended 
in the previous section, we start by using ‘duration of family migration at age 12’ as an 
exclusion restriction. 
We begin by simply using 2SLS to estimate equation (6). Results are displayed in Table 
7, columns (1) and (2). The estimated effect is substantial and statistically significant: an increase 
in the probability of migration by 10 pp would increase the probability of attaining intermediate 
secondary schooling by 8.2 pp, other things equal. 
When we add parental absence to the equation (potentially capturing disruptive effects 
of migration on educational attainment), its proxies are not significant: the coefficient on motherly 
absence has the expected negative sign, but is small, particularly when compared to the 
standard errors; the coefficient on fatherly absence is positive, but even smaller, and 
insignificant. Most importantly, controlling for parental absence does not have a significant 
impact on our coefficient of interest: the magnitude of the impact of the probability of future 
migration on educational attainment only slightly increases and keeps its statistical significance. 
As discussed in the previous section, our initial focus on a standard linear probability 
model is justified by its simplicity. However, because we are interested in precisely capturing the 
effect of a certain probability of future migration (a positive and small number limited to be 
between 0 and 1) on the probability of acquiring a certain level of education, the non-linear 
Mallar (1977) model is better suited for our purposes.20 
Columns (3) and (4) in Table 7 present results of the non-linear estimation of our model. 
Standard errors are bootstrapped. The coefficient on the latent variable for emigration is still 
positive and significant, suggesting the relevance of the brain gain hypothesis. The coefficients 
on parental absence take the same signs and statistical imprecision as in the 2SLS case. The 
remaining question regards the economic or quantitative significance of these effects. In the next 
section, we will use simulation techniques to generate counterfactual scenarios of education and 
emigration in order to evaluate the importance of this causal effect. 
Robustness check 1: instrument choice 
In our baseline specification, we explore the information content conveyed by family networks 
in determining an individual’s likelihood to emigrate (as provided by the maximum duration of 
earlier migration in the household). We now turn to check the robustness of our findings by 
including a proxy for local migration networks as an additional determinant of an individual’s 
probability to emigrate. In particular, we estimate our model using different techniques, 
including two exclusion restrictions provided to us by the ‘duration of family migration at age 
12’ and the ‘local proportion of migrants’. (Recall that the adequacy of this procedure is 
discussed in Section 4.) 
The results from this robustness check are displayed in Table 8. As 2SLS is less robust 
to the inclusion of weak instruments than LIML (Limited Information Maximum Likelihood) or 
CUE (Continuously Updated GMM Estimator),21 and we can only marginally reject the null 
hypothesis of joint weak instruments, we include estimation results for these two methods as 
well as for the initial 2SLS and most appropriate two-stage non-linear Mallar (1977) method. 
                                                                          
20. In other words, we do not want to capture the effect of migrating or not [0,1], but the effect of a certain probability of 
future migration (a number between 0 and 1). We believe that this distinction is essential in order to understand why the 
results using the linear probability model should not be interpreted directly. 
21. See Stock and Yogo (2005) for a discussion and evidence on this topic. 
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The estimated coefficients on the probability of future emigration are remarkably stable 
across estimation methods: 2SLS, LIML and CUE yield similar magnitudes, pointing to an effect 
in the interval 6.3-7.1 pp for a 10 pp increase in the migration probability, although the LIML and 
CUE estimates are slightly less statistically significant than the coefficient obtained using 2SLS. 
Relative to the baseline specification, there is a (small) decrease in the magnitude of the 
estimated effect both using 2SLS and the Mallar (1977) non-linear method. Overall including an 
additional instrument does not greatly change results. 
Robustness check 2: sample choice 
One may think that our estimates are capturing a local effect on a particular subgroup of 
individuals. In particular, one could conjecture that the ‘brain gain’ effect should be 
concentrated on those who actually end up migrating at some point in the future. 
In order to check this hypothesis we consider the following latent variable for the 
decision of obtaining education for individuals who never migrated: 
        isiii XMS   ')1Pr( 210
*
where we observe )0(1 *  ii SS (10) 
According to (10), child i’s educational attainment (Si) depends on Pr (Mi = 1), the 
probability of own future migration. 
In order to identify our parameter of interest (1), the first step in our empirical 
procedure is the estimation of the probability to emigrate for dependents aged 16 to 30 who 
never migrated. We then proceed to a second step in which we use characteristics of 
individuals at age 12 (using our full history of residents and migrants’ lives and associated 
characteristics) to predict their probability of emigration at that age. In a third and final step, this 
predicted probability of future emigration evaluated at age 12 is used as an independent 
variable. To account for the estimation procedure of the probability of future migration, standard 
errors are bootstrapped. 
The results obtained from this procedure are summarized in Table 9. We find that the 
effect of the own probability of future migration on those who never migrated seems to be 
actually larger than for comparable individuals who migrated from age 16. Indeed, the estimated 
coefficients displayed in Table 9 are larger than those obtained in any of the specifications we 
considered before. For the case of 2SLS, the interpretation of the coefficient is very clear: an 
increase in the probability of own future migration of 10 pp would increase the probability of 
attaining intermediate secondary schooling by 8 to 10.2 pp, ceteris paribus. 
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6 Counterfactual results: educational responses to migration barriers 
The objective of this section is to illustrate the economic significance of the ‘brain gain’ 
estimates we obtained. In particular, we derive the quantitative implications on education of 
changing barriers to migration (e.g. caused by tightened immigration policies in destination 
countries) by using our estimation of the non-linear simultaneous-equation Mallar (1977) 
model. Unlike existing studies, which assume the educational attainment of current and return 
emigrants would have been the same had they not emigrated, our model allows us to 
consider the impact of migration policy shocks on both education and migration decisions.  
Using this framework, we start by examining the impact of changes in migration 
barriers on emigration and, as a consequence, on the educational attainment of individuals aged 
16-30 who never resided away from Cape Verde until age 16 (following the estimation 
methodology adopted in the previous section). Using our simultaneous equation model allows 
us to evaluate the differential impact on educational attainment for those who choose to 
emigrate and for those who do not. 
We then turn to analyzing the impact of the same shock on the emigration and 
educational decisions of all Cape Verdean born individuals aged 16 to 30. This includes 
individuals who emigrated before age 16, who will potentially have obtained (further) education 
after migration. For this reason, in this exercise we complement our survey with data from the 
censuses of the main host countries. 
Changes in migration barriers for individuals who resided in Cape Verde 
at least until age 16 
We begin by creating a counterfactual shock decreasing emigration prospects in our 
empirical model.22 It basically consists of exogenously reducing the constant term in migration 
equation (5) by an amount 2, where  is an arbitrary positive value and 2 is the variance of 
the error term in the reduced form of the migration equation.23 This shock may be interpreted 
as an increase in emigration barriers that do not directly affect the incentives to invest in 
education – for example, a tightening in immigration policies of receiving countries.  
As detailed in Appendix C, given our parameter estimates and the individual values of Xi 
and Yi in our sample, we can simulate individual decisions of educational attainment and 
migration and, given those decisions, calculate the educational attainment of migrants and of 
non-migrants, as displayed in column (2) of Table 10. Indeed, columns (1)-(20 in Table 10 show 
that our procedure approximates well actual migration rates and educational attainment of both 
migrants and non-migrants. 
For a given counterfactual shock, we can re-compute relevant parameters, and again 
simulate individual migration and education decisions. Columns (3)-(6) in Table 10 describe what 
happens when barriers to migration gradually increase. First, as expected, a gradual increase in 
migration barriers implies a gradual decrease in the probability of emigration. Second, as a 
consequence, educational attainment (especially of non-migrants) is strikingly affected by the 
lower probability of migration: when emigration falls by 10 pp, the probability of attaining 
                                                                          
22. Appendix C presents in detail the derivations underlying our methodology. 
23. Notice that due to the endogeneity of migration and educational attainment, a decrease in the constant term of (5) 
would affect the reduced form of both the migration and the educational attainment equations. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 26 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0902 
intermediate secondary education decreases by 25 pp for non-migrants (implying an elasticity of 
0.49), whereas the reduction for migrants is smaller but still sizable (16 pp, implying an elasticity 
of 0.26).24 Note that the educational costs of closing migration possibilities seem to be non-
linear (indeed non-monotonically increasing): it is much less costly in terms of educational 
attainment to bring the stock of emigrants down from say 10% to 6% of Cape Verdean 
nationals (implying an elasticity of 0.37 for non-migrants, and 0.19 for migrants), than from 6% 
to 3% (implying an elasticity of 0.44 for non-migrants, and 0.22 for migrants). Overall, these 
counterfactual results are strongly supportive of the hypothesis of ‘brain gain’ as opposed to 
‘brain drain’.25 
Changes in migration barriers for all individuals who were born in Cape Verde  
The counterfactual scenarios just described may be over-estimating the educational costs of 
restricting migration. Indeed, changes in migration barriers may prompt those who emigrated 
before age 16 to return to Cape Verde, and these individuals may be more likely to have 
attained intermediate secondary schooling than the corresponding person in Cape Verde or 
an emigrant departing at an older age. To investigate this possibility, we now propose a way 
to account for the number and characteristics of individuals who migrated before age 16 by 
combining information from census data of the destination countries.  
As detailed in Appendix C, we propose to re-weight the original survey individual 
observations in order to account for the missing individuals who migrated before age 16.26 The 
idea is to use weights in order to increase the importance of migrants who departed after age 
16 in our sample and whose characteristics match the characteristics of all migrants. 
Table 11 shows the reweighted results. Compared to Table 10, both non-migrants and 
migrants display slightly increased educational performance. This happens because our 
counterfactual scenarios now indirectly include some of the migrants departing before age 16, 
who are better educated than those who leaving later in life. Nevertheless, it is clear that 
educational attainment still falls visibly when emigration decreases: a 9 pp decrease in the 
probability of migrating is associated with a fall of 11 pp in the educational attainment for non-
migrants (implying an elasticity of 0.34), and a drop of 7 pp in the educational attainment for 
migrants (implying an elasticity of 0.17). Once more, we observe that the educational costs of 
closing migration possibilities seem to be non-linear: it is much less costly in terms of 
educational attainment to bring the stock of emigrants down from 13% to 9% of Cape Verdean 
nationals (implying an elasticity of 0.34 for non-migrants, and 0.17 for migrants), than from 9% 
to 6% (implying an elasticity of 0.41 for non-migrants, and 0.20 for migrants). This evidence is 
again suggestive of the importance of the ‘brain gain’ mechanism, now even after we account 
for the educational upgrade by early migrants who may return when migration policies are made 
more restrictive. 
                                                                          
24. This asymmetric behavior is due to the positive correlation between the reduced form error terms (u1i, u2i). In the 
counterfactual world, when it becomes harder to emigrate, only those who have very high random draws, u2i, will 
eventually emigrate. Those individuals also present high u1i, decreasing the effect of the overall reduction on S* due to 
the fall in M*. 
25. Note that additional human capital gains from emigration are created by return migration. We abstract from this 
channel in the present exercise as return migration does not seem quantitatively important for our specific counterfactual 
exercise: indeed, only 4% of all emigrants aged 16 to 30 years old report to have returned. This is consistent with the 
odds of temporary migration increasing with the age of migration (Lacuesta, 2006). A more adequate treatment of the 
‘brain gain’ from return migration can be found in Batista et al. (2007). 
26. Recall that early emigrants (before age 16) are not well described in our survey, as they mostly left with their whole 
families. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 27 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0902 
7 Why does the own future probability of migration matter for educational 
decisions? 
According to our empirical results, there is a sizable positive effect of the own future 
probability of emigration on educational attainment. This finding raises further questions. In 
particular, one would like to understand the mechanisms underlying this effect. In this section 
we discuss three non-exclusive possible channels through which future migration may 
contribute to increased educational attainment in Cape Verde. 
We start with the hypothesis that higher returns to education abroad relative to Cape 
Verde increase educational attainment when there is a positive probability of migrating in the 
future. This is in line with the traditional selection arguments proposed by Borjas (1987) and 
underlying the original ‘brain gain’ theory. The point here is that the option of emigrating to a 
country where returns to schooling are higher should increase an individual’s incentive to 
acquire education, since the possibility of migration turns this individual’s expected return to 
schooling into a weighted (by the probability of migration) average of returns at home and 
abroad.  
In order to present a preliminary test of this hypothesis, we are interested in comparing 
the returns to education (defined as completing 9 years of schooling) in Cape Verde and in the 
United States.27 We compare information on wages earned by Cape Verdean in the US (from 
IPUMS, Ruggles et al. 2004) and in Cape Verde (from INE 2004). For this purpose, we run wage 
regressions controlling for gender, age, education, marital status and regional dummies.28 
Because some people obtain their degrees at home whereas other people study after migration 
and the quality of education could be very different in Cape Verde and in the United States, we 
need to somehow control for this issue. We choose to interact the educational outcome with the 
age of entry in the US, as we expect that those who enter being children, will have a higher 
likelihood of having achieved their degree in the US. 
Figure 2 shows that workers completing intermediate secondary schooling in Cape 
Verde double the wage of individuals with less education. The actual log-difference between the 
two groups is 0.92. This differential is much higher than that for Cape Verdean in the United 
States (0.37). Returns to education in the United States vary markedly, however, with the age of 
entry. Indeed, the earlier someone enters, the higher the return, which is consistent with what 
could be expected assuming a higher quality of education in the US. Nevertheless, returns to 
education in the United States never overcome returns to education in Cape Verde. Therefore, 
the average return to education (weighted by the probability of emigration) will never be higher 
than the return in Cape Verde alone.  
How can we then explain the observed pattern of positive selection for emigration 
together with the positive effect of future emigration on education? Hatton and Williamson 
(2001) observe that emigration out of African countries seems to be significantly determined by 
cross-country real wage differentials. Indeed, although their sample does not include Cape 
Verde, it is very likely that wage differentials between Cape Verde and the destination countries 
have not been competed away – as assumed by the standard Roy model selection arguments 
                                                                          
27. The Portuguese census does not provide information on wages, and in other sources there are too few Cape 
Verdean in the sample. 
28. The results of those regressions are available upon request. 
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used by Borjas (1987).29 As argued by Akee (forthcoming), in this instance, it may be more 
appropriate to consider the alternative model of Jasso and Rosenzweig (2005). This model, 
which may be thought of as nested within the Roy model, takes the first (instead of the second) 
moments of the income distribution across countries (i.e. wage differentials) as determining 
incentives for the most educated individuals to emigrate. In this context, skilled individuals 
decide to emigrate despite the lower relative returns to education abroad because of the sizable 
absolute differences in wages.30 
Table 12 shows that indeed there are substantial differences between annual wages in 
Cape Verde and the US. The average 25-50 year old male, can earn around 12,000 additional 
international dollars after migrating to the US. This difference is significantly wider (21,000 
additional international dollars) if we do not adjust for purchasing power differences, which 
makes sense for those who are able to save and remit US earnings to Cape Verde. If we take 
into account educational attainment, we observe that the US-Cape Verde wage differential for 
those who complete intermediate secondary schooling (9 grades) is only 540 international 
dollars, or 8% of the average unskilled annual wage in Cape Verde. This differential between 
educated and non-educated workers is much higher when we do not take PPP into 
consideration: it amounts to 4582 international dollars, or 232% of the average unskilled annual 
wage in Cape Verde. 
This evidence is partially supportive of the hypothesis that absolute wage differentials 
determine positive emigrant selection in Cape Verde, in opposition to relative returns to 
education. This idea seems to have empirical support especially when there is an intention to 
save and return to the origin country, or sizable remittances are sent back home. Indeed, this 
mechanism may well explain why these individuals would like to invest in human capital before 
emigrating. For individuals who emigrate with their whole family and who do not plan to return to 
the origin country, it is, however, not obvious that it compensates to invest in further education 
based on absolute real wage differentials alone. 
We finally argue that, in addition to the observed wage differentials, the incentive to 
acquire further education for individuals who plan to permanently emigrate in the future may also 
arise from decreased migration costs due to education (as may be true of language barriers or 
legal characteristics of immigration policies in destination countries, for example). In this 
instance, individuals would be interested in acquiring more education to achieve a higher 
probability of emigration in the future, in line with the predictions of Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) 
for the Mexican case. This argument is similar to that of absolute wage differentials, but further 
explores the implications of nominal costs of migration, which may depend on individual levels of 
education. 
We have only rather limited evidence, although very much supportive of this 
hypothesis. In fact, selection patterns seem to closely follow linguistic distances. In addition to 
the finding presented in the descriptive statistics section, that positive educational selection of 
emigrants is much stronger to the US than to Portugal, we have preliminary evidence pointing to 
selection patterns of emigration to France being very similar to those of emigration to the US, 
                                                                          
29. Batista (2008) discusses other instances in which this is the case even within more closely integrated economies, 
namely within the European Union. 
30. Rosenzweig (2007), Belot and Hatton (2008) and Hanson and Grogger (2008) all present evidence supportive of this 
absolute wage differentials hypothesis - the first for Asian students in the US, and the latter two for immigrants in OECD 
countries. 
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whereas emigration to Spain closely resembles emigration to Portugal.31 This is in line with the 
fact that the Spanish language is very similar to Portuguese (spoken in Cape Verde), whereas 
French and English are not. Linguistic distance could indeed be a further motivation for acquiring 
additional education before emigrating. 
                                                                          
31. Considering immigrants in the French census coming from non-French speaking African countries, we observe that 
their selection pattern is similar to that of Cape Verdean immigrants in the United States. On the contrary, the Spanish 
census points to immigrant selection being very similar to that coming from the Portuguese census. 
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8 Concluding remarks 
This paper contributes in various ways to the important but still scarce literature on the effects 
of emigration in origin countries. It departs from the essential premise that educational 
choices may depend on emigration options. This assertion has important implications. First, it 
demands an explicit test for the effect of the prospect of own future emigration on educational 
attainment – the original ‘brain gain’ hypothesis. Our empirical strategy uses full histories of 
migrants provided by our tailored microdata survey, allowing us to directly test this hypothesis 
unlike existing studies. Second, it suggests the need to correct for educational upgrading 
after emigration. This correction addresses an important shortcoming in past work assuming 
that the educational attainment of current and return emigrants would have been the same 
had they not emigrated. In our counterfactual simulations of changes in migration barriers, we 
take this consideration into account by combining our survey data with information from 
censuses of the main destination countries, while using a model simultaneously determining 
migration and educational decisions. 
Overall, our results point to ‘brain drain’ not being as serious a problem as traditionally 
thought. Indeed, this paper finds that massive emigration from Cape Verde seems to have 
significantly encouraged the accumulation of human capital in the country. Our estimates 
suggest that an increase in the probability of own future migration by 10 pp increases the 
average probability of completing intermediate secondary schooling by around 8 pp.  
The evidence obtained in this study should lead policymakers in both developing and 
developed countries not to focus their attention in restricting migration flows of educated 
individuals. Not only are destination countries likely to benefit from the inflow of these skilled 
immigrants, as is relatively undisputed, but these flows may also be beneficial for origin countries 
as Cape Verde. Indeed, while further studies on other source countries of educated migration 
are required to make a general argument, for this case at least, keeping the doors of rich 
countries open to educated migration may be regarded as a form of ‘efficient aid’. 
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Figures 
Figure 2: Returns to intermediate secondary schooling by age of immigration. 
Males.
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Table 1: Migration flows and stocks. 
  
Own Survey  International Censuses 
Flow of emigrants as % of residents in Cape Verde  
Between 2000 and 2005 3.96%  
Between 1995 and 2000  2.80% 
   
Flow of return migrants as % of current emigrants  
Between 2000 and 2005 19%  
Between 1995 and 2000  25% 
Source: Own survey, INE (2002) and international censuses of destination countries (Portugal, United 
States, France, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy and Spain) from Ruggles et al. (2004). 
 
 
Table 2: Main destinations of Cape Verdean emigrants. Percentage of total emigration flows. 
  Own Survey 
2000-2005 
Cape Verde Census  
1995-2000  
Portugal 54 55 
US 21 19 
France 12 8 
Netherlands 2 5 
Luxemburg 2 - 
Brazil 3 - 
Other 6 13 
Source: Own survey and INE (2002).  
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Table 3: Characteristics of individuals born in Cape Verde according to their country of residence and migration status. 
Censuses Own Survey  
Own 
Survey 
Own 
Survey 
  
Residents Abroad 
 
Portugal 
(2001) 
United 
States 
(2001) 
Total to 
Portugal 
and US 
Total to  
Main 
Destination
s 
Residents 
Abroad 
Residents 
in Cape 
Verde 
Return 
Migrants 
Total (*) 44,060 27,059 71,119 100,924 (*) 50,283 (*) 431,989 (*) 10,627 (*)
Gender        
Male population 51.27% 51.31% 51.29% 49.08% 51.99% 47.95% 64.46% 
Age        
0-10 years 7.85% 3.21% 6.09% 6.87% 0.35% 21.39% 2.42% 
11-20 years 14.17% 16.58% 15.09% 14.57% 11.19% 28.63% 4.85% 
21-30 years 20.06% 16.44% 18.68% 17.94% 33.92% 12.91% 5.45% 
31-40 years 24.66% 21.14% 23.32% 25.32% 25.00% 13.05% 17.58% 
41-50 years 20.33% 19.25% 19.92% 19.86% 20.45% 10.14% 15.76% 
51-60 years 5.82% 8.96% 7.01% 6.74% 8.04% 4.44% 11.52% 
61-70 years 4.73% 8.03% 5.99% 5.35% 0.87% 4.24% 18.79% 
71-80 years 1.74% 3.80% 2.52% 2.18% 0.17% 3.80% 20.61% 
81-90 years 0.58% 2.04% 1.14% 0.97% 0.00% 1.19% 3.03% 
>90 0.07% 0.54% 0.25% 0.19% 0.00% 0.02% 0.00% 
Source: Own survey and international censuses of destination countries (Portugal, United States, France, Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, Italy and Spain) from Ruggles et al. (2004).  
(*) Total number of residents abroad is sum of Cape Verde citizens living abroad divided by 0.92, as detailed in text. 
Number of residents in Cape Verde from INE (2002) census. Number of residents abroad from the survey uses fraction of 
residents abroad in total residents (11.64%). Number of return migrants from the survey uses fraction of return migrants in 
total residents (2.46%). 
Table 4: Educational attainment of individuals born in Cape Verde and aged 25 years old according to their country of 
residence. 
Censuses 
Residents Abroad 
Estimate (*) Own Survey
Portugal 
United 
States 
Total 
Portugal  
+  
United States 
Residents 
Abroad 
Residents in 
Cape Verde
   
Completed intermediate secondary (9 grades) or 
less
84.45% 29.80% 65.37% 56.47% 77.58% 
Completed secondary (12 grades) 9.34% 63.12% 28.12% 36.87% 19.02% 
Completed university 6.21% 7.06% 6.51% 6.65% 3.40% 
Source: Own survey and international censuses of destination countries (Portugal, United States, France, Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, Italy and Spain) from Ruggles et al. (2004).  
(*) As discussed in the text, it is assumed that 25% of all emigrants (those who do not emigrate to the United States and 
Portugal) share the educational attainment of those in the United States.
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Table 5: Probability of migration for dependents aged 16 to 30 who did not migrate before age 16.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  OLS PROBIT OLS PROBIT 
Duration of migration spell in household at age 12 0.0054 0.0233 0.0049 0.0207 
  (0.0015)*** (0.0052)*** (0.0014)*** (0.0052)*** 
Proportion of migrants in locality   0.2732 1.5243 
    (0.1090)** (0.5564)*** 
Absent mother 0.0911 0.4776 0.0782 0.4267 
 (0.0613) (0.2397)** (0.0629) (0.2482)* 
Absent father 0.0094 0.0425 0.0055 0.0368 
 (0.0205) (0.1170) (0.0205) (0.1164) 
Male -0.0203 -0.0914 -0.0214 -0.1099 
 (0.0184) (0.0968) (0.0183) (0.0967) 
Age 0.0866 0.7334 0.0864 0.7280 
 (0.0210)*** (0.1288)*** (0.0209)*** (0.1286)*** 
Age^2 -0.0016 -0.0138 -0.0016 -0.0137 
  (0.0005)*** (0.0027)*** (0.0005)*** (0.0027)*** 
Number of children in household -0.0024 -0.0147 -0.0022 -0.0141 
 (0.0037) (0.0205) (0.0037) (0.0209) 
Asset ownership 0.0565 0.3672 0.0532 0.3531 
 (0.0226)** (0.1746)** (0.0224)** (0.1716)** 
Maximum parental education 0.0132 0.0661 0.0126 0.0641 
 (0.0032)*** (0.0156)*** (0.0033)*** (0.0157)*** 
Perceived quality of educational system in Cape Verde 0.0034 0.0167 0.0031 0.0207 
  (0.0070) (0.0392) (0.0070) (0.0387) 
Local ratio of educated to non-educated individuals 0.0731 0.2612 0.0766 0.2534 
 (0.0845) (0.4003) (0.0848) (0.3919) 
Local average unemployment -0.0616 -0.5689 -0.0560 -0.6163 
  (0.2392) (1.1811) (0.2385) (1.1588) 
Urban, Island Controls Included Included Included Included 
F-Statistic on Excluded Instruments 13.61 19.97 10.06 28.8 
Observations 1553 1553 1553 1553 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at household level. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 6: Probability of completing intermediate secondary schooling for dependents aged 16 to 30 who did not migrate before age 16.
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  OLS OLS OLS PROBIT PROBIT PROBIT 
Own migration 0.1292 0.1199 0.1195 0.3677 0.4520 0.4508 
 (0.0376)*** (0.0375)*** (0.0368)*** (0.1161)*** (0.1352)*** (0.1326)*** 
Absent mother   0.0168   0.1067 
   (0.0784)   (0.2321) 
Absent father   0.0268 0.1086 
   (0.0343)   (0.1068) 
Male  0.0005 0.0003 -0.0199 -0.0221 
  (0.0250) (0.0249) (0.0792) (0.0791) 
Age  0.0154 0.0147  0.0189 0.0179 
  (0.0301) (0.0301) (0.0963) (0.0962) 
Age^2  -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0018 -0.0018 
  (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0021) (0.0021) 
Number of children in household  -0.0220 -0.0208  -0.0695 -0.0651 
  (0.0072)*** (0.0074)*** (0.0209)*** (0.0217)*** 
Asset ownership  0.0974 0.0963 0.3268 0.3240 
  (0.0503)* (0.0500)* (0.1548)** (0.1535)** 
Maximum parental education  0.0272 0.0285 0.1027 0.1087 
  (0.0038)*** (0.0040)*** (0.0142)*** (0.0150)*** 
Perceived quality of educational   0.0167 0.0171 0.0659 0.0671 
system in Cape Verde  (0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0401) (0.0402)* 
Local ratio of educated to non-   0.3063 0.3025 1.4279 1.4306 
educated individuals  (0.1085)*** (0.1090)*** (0.4615)*** (0.4657)*** 
Local average unemployment  -0.2693 -0.2570 0.2469 0.3100 
  (0.3752) (0.3772)  (1.2556) (1.2707) 
Urban, Island Controls Not Included Included Included 
Not 
Included Included Included 
Observations 1787 1541 1541 1787 1541 1541 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at household level. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 7: Probability of completing intermediate secondary schooling for dependents aged 16 to 30 who did not migrate 
before age 16.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  2SLS 2SLS MALLAR MALLAR 
Own migration 0.8219 0.8390 0.7019 0.7045 
  (0.3832)** (0.3900)** (0.3047)** (0.3021)** 
Absent mother  -0.0527  -0.2059 
  (0.0879)  (0.3132) 
Absent father  0.0236  0.0863 
  (0.0366)  (0.1133) 
Male 0.0127 0.0139 0.0305 0.0364 
 (0.0284) (0.0286) (0.0855) (0.0867) 
Age -0.0483 -0.0498 -0.4595 -0.4696 
 (0.0477) (0.0481) (0.2403)* (0.2405)* 
Age^2 0.0004 0.0004 0.0072 0.0074 
  (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0046) (0.0046) 
Number of children in household -0.0221 -0.0209 -0.0665 -0.0617 
 (0.0071)*** (0.0075)*** (0.0230)*** (0.0239)** 
Asset ownership 0.0510 0.0525 0.0782 0.0993 
 (0.0567) (0.0559) (0.2039) (0.1958) 
Maximum parental education 0.0181 0.0188 0.0616 0.0649 
 (0.0063)*** (0.0069)*** (0.0248)** (0.0263)** 
Perceived quality of educational system in Cape Verde 0.0137 0.0140 0.0536 0.0535 
  (0.0130) (0.0132) (0.0428) (0.0431) 
Local ratio of educated to non-educated individuals 0.2592 0.2596 1.3304 1.3555 
 (0.1276)** (0.1288)** (0.5141)*** (0.5216)*** 
Local average unemployment -0.2650 -0.2286 0.4137 0.6421 
  (0.4031) (0.4057) (1.3562) (1.3884) 
Urban, Island Controls Included Included Included Included 
Observations 1541 1541 1541 1541 
IV:  Duration of longest migration spell in household at age 12. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at household level. Standard errors are bootstrapped for Mallar regressions. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 8: Probability of completing intermediate secondary schooling for dependents aged 16 to 30 who did not migrate
before age 16.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  2SLS LIML CUE MALLAR 
Own migration 0.6527 0.7097 0.6329 0.4518 
  (0.3310)** (0.3723)* (0.3275)* (0.2295)** 
Absent mother -0.0347 -0.0402 -0.0216 -0.0890 
 (0.0824) (0.0846) (0.0811) (0.2928) 
Absent father 0.0244 0.0242 0.0214 0.0877 
 (0.0354) (0.0358) (0.0353) (0.1130) 
Male 0.0104 0.0114 0.0095 0.0188 
 (0.0270) (0.0276) (0.0270) (0.0861) 
Age -0.0331 -0.0382 -0.0308 -0.2839 
 (0.0432) (0.0460) (0.0429) (0.1928) 
Age^2 0.0001 0.0002 0.0000 0.0039 
  (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0037) 
Number of children in household -0.0209 -0.0209 -0.0210 -0.0620 
 (0.0073)*** (0.0074)*** (0.0074)*** (0.0240)** 
Asset ownership 0.0638 0.0603 0.0702 0.1846 
 (0.0536) (0.0547) (0.0533) (0.1804) 
Maximum parental education 0.0213 0.0205 0.0210 0.0807 
 (0.0062)*** (0.0067)*** (0.0062)*** (0.0233)*** 
Perceived quality of educational system in  0.0148 0.0146 0.0180 0.0556 
 Cape Verde (0.0128) (0.0129) (0.0126) (0.0426) 
Local ratio of educated to non-educated  0.2707 0.2673 0.2794 1.4586 
individuals (0.1209)** (0.1234)** (0.1200)** (0.5357)***
Local average unemployment -0.2360 -0.2337 -0.2094 0.6554 
  (0.3900) (0.3944) (0.3887) (1.4275) 
Urban, Island Controls Included Included Included Included 
Observations 1541 1541 1541 1541 
IVs:  Duration of longest migration spell in household at age 12; Proportion of migrants in locality. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at household level. Standard errors are bootstrapped for Mallar 
regressions. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 9: Probability of completing intermediate secondary schooling for dependents aged 16 to 30 who never emigrated. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  2SLS MALLAR 2SLS MALLAR 
Own migration 1.0205 0.7856 0.7974 0.5440 
  (0.4879)** (0.3693)** 0.3967)** (0.2692)** 
Absent mother -0.1054 -0.3661 -0.0847 -0.2622 
 (0.1002) (0.3212) (0.0940) (0.2867) 
Absent father -0.0013 0.0154 0.0003 0.0147 
 (0.0375) (0.1178) (0.0374) (0.1170) 
Male 0.0257 0.0680 0.0220 0.0550 
 (0.0282) (0.0912) (0.0281) (0.0905) 
Age -0.0734 -0.5571 -0.0532 -0.3765 
 (0.0527) (0.2841)* (0.0469) (0.2166)* 
Age^2 0.0008 0.0089 0.0004 0.0055 
  (0.0010) (0.0054)* (0.0009) (0.0042) 
Number of children in household -0.0238 -0.0671 -0.0238 -0.0676 
 (0.0082)*** (0.0249)*** 0.0083)*** (0.0248)*** 
Asset ownership 0.0348 0.0183 0.0463 0.0986 
 (0.0597) (0.2140) (0.0577) (0.1916) 
Maximum parental education 0.0148 0.0485 0.0178 0.0632 
 (0.0082)* (0.0301) 0.0072)** (0.0255)** 
Perceived quality of educational system in  0.0080 0.0313 0.0087 0.0321 
Cape Verde  (0.0143) (0.0442) (0.0142) (0.0437) 
Local ratio of educated to non-educated  0.2561 1.2063 0.2706 1.3274 
individuals (0.1360)* (0.5507)** 0.1342)** (0.5647)** 
Local average unemployment -0.3579 -0.1173 -0.3599 -0.0526 
  (0.4155) (1.4490) (0.4134) (1.4885) 
Urban, Island Controls Included Included Included Included 
Observations 1346 1346 1346 1346 
IV:  “Duration of longest migration spell in household at age 12” in columns (1) and (2). “Duration of longest migration 
spell in household at age 12” and “Local proportion of migrants” in columns (3) and (4). 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at household level. Standard errors are bootstrapped for Mallar regressions. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Table 10: Counterfactual educational attainment of individuals born in Cape Verde aged 16 to 30 who did not migrate 
before age 16. 
Counterfactual scenarios for emigration Survey 
(2006) 
Estimation 
Lowest 
Migration 
Cost 
delta=-0.2
 
 
 
delta=-0.5 
 
 
 
delta=-0.8 
Highest 
Migration 
Cost
delta=-1.0 
Stock migrants (% of total Cape Verdean born) 10.41% 12.67% 9.46% 5.77% 3.32% 2.23% 
Non-migrants attaining intermediate secondary 
education 62.48% 62.19% 57.26% 49.76% 42.17% 37.24% 
Migrants attaining intermediate secondary education 77.00% 76.19% 73.33% 68.23% 63.72% 60.03% 
Source: Own survey (2006) and own computations.       
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Table 11: Counterfactual educational attainment of all individuals born in Cape Verde aged 16 to 30. Reweighted 
in order to account for individuals missing in the survey. (*) 
Counterfactual scenarios for emigration Estimation 
Lowest 
Migration 
Cost 
delta=-0.2
 
 
 
delta=-0.5 
 
 
 
delta=-0.8 
Highest 
Migration 
Cost
delta=-1.0
Stock migrants (% of total Cape Verdean born)  17.43% 13.25% 8.49% 5.19% 3.57%
Non-migrants attaining intermediate secondary 
education 
 64.19% 59.78% 52.90% 45.81% 41.04%
Migrants attaining intermediate secondary education  79.09% 76.54% 72.34% 67.98% 65.15%
Source: Own survey (2006), Ruggles et al. (2004) and own computations.
(*) Individuals missing in the survey are those migrants who migrated before age 16 and are currently aged 16 to 30 
years old.
 
Table 12: Average annual wages of Cape Verdean. Males between 25 and 50 years old. 
  Cape Verde US Difference 
US Dollars (nominal exchange rate)    
Less or equal to 9 years of schooling 1,975.6 18,262.5 16,286.9 
More than 9 years of schooling 3,789.3 24,658.0 20,868.7 
Difference   4,581.8 
    
International Dollars (PPP-adjusted)    
Less or equal to 9 years of schooling 6,378.4 18,262.5 11,884.1 
More than 9 years of schooling 12,234.1 24,658.0 12,423.9 
Difference   539.8 
Source: Own computations based on data from Ruggles et al. (2004) for the US and INE (2004) for Cape Verde. Original 
numbers adjusted using nominal and PPP exchange rates from WDI (2006). 
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A)    Appendix A: Household survey 
The tailored data collection consisted of survey (face-to-face) interviews conducted by teams 
of local interviewers and one of the authors. The interviews were conducted from December 
2005 to March 2006. We were responsible for the recruitment and training of the local teams 
– made sure that each interviewer had at least a total of 18 hours of training in groups of 2-3 
individuals. Training included lectures on the content/objectives of the survey; answering the 
questionnaire; and piloting (at least once per interviewer). 
The survey questionnaire was submitted to 1066 households (997 complete interviews) 
in 30 (or 5%) of the 561 census areas of Cape Verde. It was composed of two modules: one on 
perceived quality/corruption of public services; and the other on migration characteristics of the 
household. The English translation for the full questionnaire is available at 
http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/resprogs/corruption/cv/questcveng.pdf. 
The sampling process was such that sampled census areas were chosen randomly 
weighting by the number of households, and households within a census area were chosen 
randomly using standard techniques (nth house, with second visits tried in the same day). The 
requirement condition for a household to be interviewed was family residence in the country 
anytime in 1985-2006. The requirement condition for a respondent within a household to be 
interviewed was to be aged 30 or more years old. 
There were two imperfections to the random sampling of households in the survey. 
One was differences in attempted interviews in the different census areas, and the other was the 
fact that we had non-respondents. We use weighted data to account for these problems 
(although differences to unweighted data are negligible throughout) for which data collected 
from non-respondents are exploited (gender, approximate age, approximate schooling, and 
approximate income). 
Additional details on the fieldwork and survey can be found at  
http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/resprogs/corruption/cv/cv.htm. 
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B) Appendix B: Classification of educational attainment 
Comparing educational attainment from different sources is often difficult because of 
variations in classification. In all data sets, there are questions regarding complete levels of 
education. However, the disaggregation level is higher in some sources, which may make it 
difficult to draw comparisons with sources adopting lower disaggregation levels. For instance, 
Docquier and Marfouk (2006) identify the selection of migrants in three educational groups: 
less than 9 years of schooling (low education), 9-12 years of schooling (medium) and over 13 
(high). The Portuguese and the US census allow grouping migrants in such way since the 
group of people who have some college without having finished the degree (13-14 years of 
schooling) is identified separately. However, in the Cape Verdean census and in our survey, 
individuals must be classified either at the pre-university level (12 years of schooling) or at the 
completed university level (at least 15 grades of schooling). Therefore, the pre-university level 
also includes people who did not finish their university degree. 
As is detailed in Table A1 below, we group individuals in 4 groups: less than 
intermediate secondary (less than 9 years of schooling), completed intermediate secondary 
(between 9 and 11 years of schooling), completed secondary (between 12 and 14 years of 
schooling) and completed university degree (15 years of schooling or more). In comparison with 
Docquier and Marfouk (2006), both classifications have the same low education group (less than 
9 years). However, adding our second and third groups encompasses more than their 
intermediate group since our third group includes individuals who did not finish their university 
degree. For the same reason, our top group of education should be smaller than their high skilled. 
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Table A1 – Comparison of educational classifications in Portugal (census), United States (census) and Cape Verde (survey)  
  Portugal 2001 
United States 2000 
(Completed) Cape Verde 2006 (Completed)
 No schooling 
Not applicable and no school 
(0,1) Illiterate (1) 
 Preschool  Pre-primary (2) 
Attending  1-4 grades (4) 1º Cycle = 4 years 
of schooling Incomplete   
Attending Primary (3) 
 Complete    
Attending   2º Cycle = 6 years 
of schooling Incomplete   
 Complete   
Attending  Complete primary (4) 
LESS THAN 
INTERMEDIATE 
SECONDARY 
3º Cycle = 9 years 
of schooling Incomplete 5-8 grades (5) From 6 to 9 grades (5) 
 Complete 9 grades (6) Secondary (6) 
  10 grades (7)  
Attending 11 grades (8)  
COMPLETED 
INTERMEDIATE 
SECONDARY Secondary = 12 
years of schooling Incomplete 12 grades (no diploma) (9)   
 Complete High school graduate (10) Pre-University (7) 
  Some College no degree (11)  
  
Associate degree/occupational 
(12)  
Incomplete   Medium = 14 
years of schooling Complete Professional degree (16)  
Attending   Baccalaureate = 15 
years of schooling Incomplete   
Attending   
COMPLETED 
SECONDARY 
Licentiate = 17 
years of schooling Incomplete     
Baccalaureate Complete Bachelor (14) Bachelor (8) COMPLETED 
UNIVERSITY Licentiate Complete  University (9) 
 Attending   
 Incomplete   
 
Master >= 17 years 
of schooling 
Complete Master (15)  
 Attending   
 Incomplete   
  
Doctorate >= 20 
years of schooling 
Complete Doctorate (17)   
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c) Appendix C: Counterfactual exercise 
The structural system given by (4)-(5) can be expressed in reduced form as:32
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where 1  and 2 are the standard deviations of u1 and u2, respectively. 
Given that the error terms (1i,  2i) in the structural model follow a bivariate normal 
distribution with correlation , i.e. ( 1i,  2i) ~ 
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(13)
 
 
In order to predict individual decisions on migration and educational attainment, one 
needs to have estimates for the corresponding latent variables, M* and S*. To obtain these 
estimates, we start by estimating (11) and (12). In addition, we need to predict the error terms 
(u1/1, u2/  2) for each individual. To account for the correlation between these error terms, we 
must have estimates for structural parameters 1 and 1, and for the correlation between 
structural error terms .34  
Using the two step method of Mallar (1977), we estimate 1 and 1.35 As this estimation 
procedure does not provide a direct estimate for the correlation between the two structural 
errors, we calibrate a covariance for (1i,  2i) to match the educational attainment of migrants and 
non-migrants. We grid over different values in the interval [-1,1], and take cov( 1i,  2i)=  =-0.75. 
We the values for these parameters in hand, we can now compute 1 and 2. 
Given our parameter estimates and the individual values of Xi and Yi in our sample, we 
are now ready to simulate individual decisions in 1000 different economies. The way to do it is to 
                                                                          
32. Recall that a probit model estimates the coefficients up to the standard deviation of the error term. 
33. Notice that  211
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35. Our exclusion restrictions are family migration duration at age 12 for the migration equation; and number of children 
in the household, regional fraction of educated individuals, and quality of educational system as perceived by 
household’s head for the educational attainment regression. 
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draw 1000 pairs of (u1i/1, u2i/2) per individual from the bivariate normal distribution described 
by (13). For each draw we estimate an individual decision of educational attainment and 
migration and, given those decisions, we calculate the educational attainment of migrants and of 
non-migrants.  
One way of creating a counterfactual shock to decrease emigration prospects in our 
empirical model is by exogenously reducing the constant term in the structural migration 
equation (5) by a certain amount: 2, where  is an arbitrary positive value and 2 is the variance 
of the error term in the reduced form of the migration equation.36 Therefore,0 becomes  0* =  0- 
2 <  0. This reduction may be interpreted as an increase in emigration barriers that do not 
directly affect the incentives to invest in education – for example, a tightening in immigration 
policies of receiving countries. The change in the constant term of the reduced form of the 
migration equation (12) is , and the change in the constant term of the reduced form of the 
educational attainment equation (11) is a linear function of , depending on parameters 1, 1 and 
2: 





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2
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0
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Taking into account this change in the constant terms of reduced form equations (11) 
and (12), we can simply re-predict individual decisions of educational attainment and migration 
for 1000 simulated economies and re-calculate educational attainment for migrants and for non-
migrants. 
We propose to re-weight the original survey individual observations in order to account 
for the missing individuals who migrated before age 16. Assuming that there is a set of 
observable characteristics X (such as gender and a quartic on age) determining educational 
attainment in the same way for emigrants who departed before and after age 16, we would just 
need to use individual weights so as to increase the importance of migrants who departed after 
age 16 in our sample and whose characteristics match the characteristics of all migrants.37 
To see how this re-weighting procedure is implemented, consider the distribution of 
characteristics of all migrants, )|( migxf , where mig denotes the realized decision to migrate 
and x is the realization of X. Using Bayes rule, one can write: 
)|16(
),|16(
1)(         where)16|()()|( migmigP
XmigmigP
xmigxfxmigxf 

 
 
This expression connects the distribution of characteristics x for individuals who 
migrated after age 16, )16|( migxf , available from our survey, to the distribution of 
characteristics of all migrants, )|( migxf  available from census data in the destination 
countries, and which we would like to reproduce in a re-weighted sample. The link between 
these two distributions is given by the reweighting function (x): this is the ratio between the 
                                                                          
36. Notice that due to the endogeneity of migration and educational attainment, a decrease in the constant term of (5) 
would affect the reduced form of both the migration and the educational attainment equations. In order to see this, just 
substitute equation (5) in (4) and vice versa. 
37. Reweighting data from the origin country instead of imputing the educational attainment observed in the destination 
country has the advantage that we do not need to consider directly educational upgrading from entering in a different 
educational system. One shortcoming might be that we miss some unobserved differences between migrants who are 
early (before age 16) and late migrants. 
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overall probability of migrating after age 16 (which can be computed from the information on all 
migrants available from the international censuses), )|16( migmigP  , and the probability 
of migrating after age 16 for an individual with certain characteristics X (which can be computed 
by estimating probit regression of the probability of migrating after age 16 depending on to 
gender and a quartic on age, again using information from the international censuses), 
),|16( XmigmigP  .38 
                                                                          
38. We use information from the US census 2001 (from Ruggles et al. 2004) to estimate
)|16( migmigP 
and 
),|16( XmigmigP 
. We only have information about the age of entry of migrants from Cape Verde to Portugal 
from the Portuguese Labor Force Survey. However, we do not have enough observations to perform this same 
estimation (recall that we are restricting the sample to migrants from Cape Verde between 16 and 30 years old). 
Because age of entry is not a variable in the Portuguese census, we must assume that the timing of migration is the 
same in both destination countries. This assumption seems appropriate according to tabulations in our survey for age of 
entry according to destination. 
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